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class provision is abolished, the Court will dutifully adhere
to it:
"It may be that the statute should be amended, but
whether the strikers, under circumstances similar to
those present here, would be acting solely for themselves or would also be acting directly or indirectly
for the claimants, is a decision the lawmakers must
make."2 9
The most logical approach would be to eliminate the
grade or class provision altogether. This would further the
ultimate purpose of the statute, which seemingly should
outweigh the more narrow justification for keeping the
provision, that of preventing the key-man work stoppage.
FRANK J. VECELLA

Estate Tax Deduction For An Entire Trust Containing
Charitable Bequest With A Possible Diversion
Of Trust Income
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. U.S.'
This was an action by the testator's executor to recover
estate taxes alleged to have been erroneously and illegally
collected. The testator, Dr. Raymond D. Havens, was a
resident of Baltimore City. After a number of specific bequests, he willed the residue of his estate as follows:
"Eighth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate, both real and personal and wheresoever situated, I give to my Trustee ... to hold, manage, invest,
and reinvest the same and pay to my sister, Ruth Mack
Havens so much of the net income as in its sole discretion it deems necessary and proper for her reasonable living expenses, comfort, maintenance, and general welfare. My Trustee in exercising this discretion
shall, however, take into consideration all assets owned
by her and any income received from any other source
of which my Trustee may have knowledge. It is my
desire that the discretionary power given to my Trus219 Md. 148, 154, 148 A. 2d 403 (1959). See a recent Pennsylvania case
remarkably similar on the facts to the instant case and citing it with
approval; U.S. Steel Oorp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 189
Pa. Super. 362, 150 A. 2d 361 (1959). And see cases collected in 28 A.L.R.
2d 287, 340-343.
'172 F. Supp. 72 (D. Md. 1959).
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tee be liberally construed. Any net income not so
required shall be accumulated and added to the principal of the trust from time to time. Upon the death
of my sister, or upon my death if she shall not survive me, I give the principal of said trust to the Johns
Hopkins University of the City of Baltimore, Maryland
for its library."
At the death of the testator the life tenant, Ruth Mack
Havens, was sixty-five years old and living in a nursing
home because of advanced senility. She was a woman of
considerable wealth, having an income of over $10,000 per
year from a pension and various trusts and the right to
use some $135,000 of capital. It was stated by the trustee's
vice president in charge of Dr. Havens' trust that the sister's income greatly exceeded her expenses, and that, therefore no part of the trust income would be used for her
support.
The government conceded that the value of the charitable remainder was deductible from the estate in the computation of the estate tax,' but it contended that the value
of the life estate was not deductible. The executor contended that under the terms of the will and the circumstances existing at the time of the testator's death, it was
apparent that none of the trust, including the income therefrom, would be paid to or used for the benefit of the life
tenant but would immediately pass to the University on the
death of the life tenant. The executor therefore claimed
that the entire residuary estate was deductible.
Chief Judge Thomsen of the District Court held that,
in computing the estate tax, the executor was entitled to
deduct the value of the entire trust, since the possibility
that the charitable remainderman would not take the entire trust was so remote as to be negligible.
An unusual feature of this case is that the non-charitable
beneficiary's interest was in the income from the testamentary trust, not in a right to invade corpus. The typical
conditional charitable bequest involves a remainder interest in the charity that is subject to possible diversion
of corpus. The court applied the rules used in such typical
cases, without mentioning any possible distinction between
21939 IRC Sec. 812(d) (new 1954 IRC Sec. 2055) provides that in determining the value of the net estate of the deceased, any bequests to a corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational purposes where no part of the net earnings
of the charitable organization inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or Individual may be deducted from the value of the gross estate.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XX

the two situations.' This point was touched upon, however, in Gilfillan v. Kelm, 4 where the wording of the trust
disposition was similar to that in the recent case and the
tax issue identical. In that case, the court remarked:
"While counsel suggests that this case may be unique
as involving the invasion of income rather than of
principal, the rules involving
the invasion of principal
'5
would seem applicable.

The test deductibility which the court applied in this
case, the one developed for conditional charitable bequests
where diversions of trust corpus are possible, is a two-fold
one. First, there must be a definite ascertainable standard
controlling the life tenant's rights of invasion. The leading
case in this area is Ithaca Trust Co. v. U.S.,O where the
court allowed the value of the charitable remainder to
be deducted from an estate giving the life tenant the
power to invade the corpus of the trust if it were necessary
to do so, in order to maintain her station in life. This
standard is generally regarded as being sufficiently definite
and ascertainable.7 "The standard must be fixed in fact
and capable of being stated in definite terms of money."'
The invasion of the corpus can not be at the pleasure, happiness, or whim of the life tenant.9
The second requirement which must be satisfied before
a deduction for a conditional charitable bequest is granted
is that "the possibility that the charity will not take the
remainder interest must be so remote as to be negligible."10
3 The court did point out that there were no Maryland cases defining the
nature and scope of a beneficiary's interest in trust income in the case of
need, and considered of some relevance the Maryland cases dealing with
rights to corpus conditioned upon need.
'128 F. Supp. 291 (D.C. Minn. 1955).
5Ibid., 293.
0279 U.S. 151 (1929), noted 9 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 288 (1929).
Mercantile-Safe Deposit, etc. Co. v. U.S., 141 F. Supp. 546 (D. Md. 1956)
hereinafter referred to as the Weglein case.
Supra, n. 6, 154.
Merchants 'Bank v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256 (1943), noted 29 Cornell
L. Q. 406 (1943) ; Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595 (1949),
noted 10 Univ. Pitt. L. Rev. 424 (1949).
10
Regs. 105, § 81.46 which implemented 1939 IRC sec. 812(d).
"Sec. 81.46. Conditional Bequests.
(a) If as of the date of decedent's death the transfer to charity is
dependent upon the performance of some act or the happening of a

precedent event in order that it might become effective, no deduction

is allowable unless the possibility that charity will not take is so
remote as to be negligible. If an estate or Interest has passed to or is
vested In charity at the time of the decedent's death and such right
or interest would be defeated by the performance of some act or the
happening of some event which appeared to have been highly improbable at the time of decedent's death, the deduction is allowable."

1960]

MERCANTILE-SAFE DEP. ETC. v. U.S.

67

The court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. U.S.-" remarked that "there
must be no uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends human affairs." If the transfer to charity is dependent upon the performance of some
act which might or might not happen, then the charitable
bequest is not deductible. 12 Thus, where, the charity would
only take if the life tenant died without issue" or the designated remaindermen predeceased the life tenant, 4 no deduction would be allowed. On the other hand, if the transfer to charity is dependent upon some act or event which
is highly improbable, then the charitable bequest is deductible..5 In U.S. v. Provident Trust Co.'" the court
granted a deduction where the charity was to take under
the residuary clause if the life tenant died without leaving
issue. At the time of the testator's death, the life tenant
was fifty years old and had been rendered incapable of
having children by an operation removing her uterus,
Fallopian tubes, and both ovaries.
In the principal case, Chief Judge Thomsen reaffirmed
his position, previously stated in the Weglein case, 7 that
before a deduction is allowed, it must be shown that the
possibility that the charity will not take is so remote as to
be negligible. In Moffett v. Commissioner,8 the Fourth
Circuit (Judge Thomsen writing the opinion) held that a
29% chance that the residuary charity would not take was
not a possibility so remote as to be called negligible. In this
case the Fourth Circuit quoted with approval the following
from U.S. v. Dean:' 9
"The line between those chances which are so remote as to be negligible and those which are not lies
somewhere between these extremes. We can not say
exactly where. We can only decide specific cases as
they arise using the best judgment we have in placing
them on one side or the other of the line. And there is
no standard to guide us except our estimate of the
extent of the encouragement tax-wise which Congress
wished to give testators to make gifts to charity. Our
judgment being largely subjective, about all we can
say is that we do not think one chance in eleven (in
n Supra, n.

6, 154.

"Supra, n. 10.
Farrington v. Commissioner, 30 F. 2d 915 (1st Cir. 1929).
11U.S. v. Dean, 224 F. 2d 26 (1st Cir. 1955).
"Supra, n. 10.
10291 U.S. 272 (1934), noted 32 Mich. L. Rev. 702 (1934).
7Supra, n. 7.

269 F. 2d 738 (4th Cir.1959).
2Supra, n. 14.
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this case the odds are approximately three chances in
ten) can be considered so remote a chance as to be
negligible, that is, a chance which persons generally
would disregard as so highly improbable that it might
be ignored with reasonable 'safety
in undertaking a
20
serious business transaction.
Though the conclusion of the court in the principal
case, that the chance of any diversion of income to Miss
Havens was so remote as to be negligible, was supportable,2 ' this test is often a difficult one to apply. This test,
as promulgated in Regs. 105 Sec. 81.46, was presumably designed for charitable bequests contingent upon the happening of a single event. Later when the courts were
faced with the problem of granting tax deductions to
charitable bequests subject to possible invasions by noncharitable beneficiaries, they continued to apply the same
test, combined with the requirement of a definite and ascertainable standard controlling the life tenant's right of
invasion. Perhaps these diversion type cases should be
handled through a partial disallowance of the charitable
deduction rather than as granting either a deduction of
the entire bequest to a charity or no deduction at all.
Where the chance of diversion of corpus to non-charitable
beneficiaries has not been so remote as to be negligible
but has been limited to a maximum dollar amount per year,
a partial deduction of the trust has been allowed, the maximum possible diversion being subtracted from the value
of the trust.2 2 Where the rights of invasion are subject to
a definite standard, even though the chances of invasion
'Ibid., 29.
In applying these tests to the principal case, Judge Thomsen found as
a fact that "at the time of the death of Dr. Havens the possibility that
his sister's income and principaZ would not be sufficient to care for her
for the balance of her life was so remote as to be negligible". He tried to
evaluate the extent of the interest which the beneficiary had where she
could obtain income only in case of need and upon the exercise of a trustee's discretion. No Maryland case directly in point, however, could be
found. The court then turned to the testimony of the vice president of the
trustee, the one handling the trust estate, who had said that his understanding of the intention of the testator and the Maryland law was that
Miss Havens would have to exhaust her own assets before any income
from the trust could be paid to her. At least technically, the trustee's own
Interpretation of the trust instrument and the applicable law would not
seem relevant. A danger in giving weight to his opinion on these matters
is that nothing prevents him from changing his interpretation in the
future. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that the testimony of
the trustee had been admitted without objection, and the court presumably
would have reached the same result, even had the trustee's testimony been
completely disregarded.
22Estate of B. F. Sternheim, 2 T.C.M. 311 (1943), reversed on other
grounds, 145 F. 2d 132 (9th Cir. 1944).
21
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are more than negligible, it would seem sound to treat the
situation this same way; that is, to compute the deduction
for the bequests to charity on the basis of what would be
the maximum possible diversion under the standard used
in the trust and the particular circumstances of the case.2"
Under such an approach, some deduction could be allowed
without straining the "so remote as to be negligible" criterion, and still the government would be adequately
protected.
JuLIAN I. JACOBS

Continuing Corporate Liability For Federal Crime
After State Dissolution Of Corporation
Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States1
Three corporate defendants - Melrose Distillers, Inc.,
CVA Corporation, and Dant Distillery and Distributing
Corporation - all wholly owned subsidiaries of Schenley
Industries, were indicted for alleged violations of Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 2 Shortly after the indictment
against them was returned, they were dissolved under
their respective state statutes, (Maryland and Delaware)
and were recreated as divisions of the parent firm. Their
motion for a dismissal of the indictment under the claim
that their dissolution abated the proceedings was denied
by the United States District Court for Maryland, which,
upon the subsequent plea of nolo contendere, levied fines
against them. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.' On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court, in
turn, affirmed, stating that the three corporations retained
sufficient life under state law to allow these criminal proceedings to continue, without finding any need to resolve
the exact interpretation of provisions of the state abatement statutes. The Court reasoned: (1) that the Sherman
Act, §8, "defines 'person' to include corporations 'existing'
under the laws of any State", and (2) regardless of how
Maryland and/or Delaware construe their respective statutes allowing dissolved corporations to continue in existence for "proceedings" already begun (narrowly, so as
to preclude subsequent state criminal prosecutions, or
2

LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND

GIFT

TAXES

1359 U.S. 271 (1959).
226 STAT. 209, §§ 1, 2; 15 U.S.C.A. (1951), §§ 1, 2
'258 F. 2d 726 (1958), Rec. Dec. 19 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1959).

(1956)

366.

